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CONCLUSIONS

A continuing quantitative analysis of military charges against Yugoslavia broadcast by the Cominform radios to their own peoples and to Yugoslavia indicates:

1. No apparent Satellite propaganda intention to step up the war of nerves against Tito insofar as the Satellite home audiences are concerned.
2. Increasing emphasis, in Satellite broadcasts to Yugoslavia, on Yugoslav resistance to Tito's military preparations; but no increase, during the past 10 weeks, of the more threatening military charges.
3. A substantial rise, coincident with the Korean negotiations, in Radio Moscow's attacks on the Tito regime.

SUMMARY

1. In the period mid-May to late July there has been no rise in the number of military charges against Tito beamed by Satellite radios to their domestic audiences. Chief of Staff Popovic's visit to Washington receives less stress in the home services than the announcement of Tito's April request for arms. Only during the week of the anniversary of the Cominform Resolution against Tito (28 June) do charges increase above average; in the succeeding three weeks they resume their normal level.
2. Since late May there has been a substantial increase in total military charges beamed by the Satellites to Yugoslavia. This increase has been particularly great during the past four weeks (see Figure #1). Most of it results from a rise in charges of Yugoslav resistance to Tito's military preparations. There have been two new qualitative developments within the resistance context during the past six weeks:

- a. Direct appeals for, as contrasted to descriptions of, resistance to militarism make their appearance for the first time at the end of May.

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b. During the past four weeks, there have been some references to partisan activities inside Yugoslavia. These have been made only rarely in the past.

The increased stress on resistance to Titoist aggression coincides with the announcement of General Popovic's presence in Washington, although the theme and the event are not explicitly related in Satellite propaganda. The propaganda evidence seems to be against the inference that a rise in resistance references--considering their implications of Yugoslav military weakness--foreshadows an attack in the near future. Further, no definitive choice can be made as between the alternative possibilities that the resistance propaganda may be intended (a) to stimulate more concrete acts of Yugoslav resistance, or (b) to offset morale gains resulting from the arrival of American arms.

3. During the last four weeks (namely, since the beginning of the Korean peace negotiations), Radio Moscow has markedly stepped up its denunciation of all aspects of the Yugoslav regime. This suggests that Moscow is using the Tito situation to further its global propaganda tactics and that the increased denunciation is not solely a reaction to the Balkan situation itself. In contrast, the pattern of current Satellite military propaganda suggests that it is more locally oriented.

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CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: FOURTH REPORT

This report, succeeding 00-F-149 of 10 May 1951, considers only Satellite charges of a military nature, charges which most directly and most convincingly aim at creating psychological tension. The use of military charges against Tito is in a sense a last weapon; Satellite condemnation of Tito in the ideological, economic, and political ranges had been largely completed by the late summer of 1949 following the USSR's denunciation of the regime as "fascist." Of the total range of accusations before the Korean war, military charges were a minor element, dealing largely and in stereotyped fashion with frontier violations and occasional espionage trials. The present report continues a series of detailed quantitative studies of current military charges based on counting and analysis at sentence level.

I. Increased Emphasis on Resistance to Military Preparations

Since mid-May, and particularly since late June, Satellite broadcasts to Yugoslav audiences have shown an increase in charges of a military character leveled against the Yugoslav regime. The major component of this increase has been the greater stress on Yugoslav civilian and army resistance to Titoist military preparations. But there has also been some concomitant rise in other military charges as well. (See Figure #1.)

Timing and Cause of Increased Stress on Resistance: Examination of the events discussed in the military context by Satellite radios reveals no explicit tie-in between these events and charges of Yugoslav resistance to Tito's militarism.

Nor is increased Satellite emphasis on Yugoslav resistance to militarism explicable as a reaction to increased Yugoslav claims of military strength since the latter has not been the case during this period.\*

The increase in resistance charges, however, is coincident with General Popovic's Washington visit to discuss the question of arms aid to Yugoslavia. At the time of the surprise announcement on 8 June, the press stated that General Popovic had arrived several weeks before, or at about the time that resistance charges started to increase. But the Satellite radios did not explicitly associate this visit with alleged Yugoslav resistance to Tito's militarism until the week of the anniversary of the Cominform Resolution on Tito (28 June)—despite their immediate and continuing attention to Popovic's visit, particularly in broadcasts to Yugoslavia.

Thus, while there is little direct linking of the propaganda concerning Popovic's visit to Washington with the increased emphasis on Yugoslav resistance,\*\* the evidence suggests that stress on resistance was an indirect reaction to that visit. This inference is supported by the fact that approximately coincident with the public announcement of Popovic's presence in Washington Satellite radios begin to interject two new types of resistance material: (a) calls for, as distinguished from descriptions of, Yugoslav resistance to Tito's militarism and aggression; and (b) descriptions of partisan activities against the Tito regime. While these charges are few in number, they have appeared consistently each week since their introduction; and almost all such charges are beamed to Yugoslav audiences.

\* Examination shows that such types of Yugoslav military references as charges against Satellite armed forces, accusations of Satellite warmongering, and discussions of popular Satellite resistance to orbit military preparations also have not increased, either prior to late May or concurrent with rising Satellite resistance charges in the weeks subsequent to Popovic's visit. Yugoslav references to resistance to military measures in Satellite countries are quite infrequent, although there has been some allusions to border guards escaping to Yugoslavia as well as to "outlaws" resisting Bulgarian grain collections.

\*\*Note the absence of overlap between attention to Popovic's visit and the resistance theme in Figure #2.

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Alternate Hypotheses Related to Increased Charges of Resistance: Why the Satellite radios should increase their resistance propaganda more than they do other military charges against the Yugoslav regime is not readily apparent. At least four possibilities present themselves.

a. Satellite propagandists may assume that the Yugoslavs will see in the arrival of American arms a definite strengthening of the Yugoslav regime against the threat of possible Cominform attack. Thus, by emphasizing civilian sabotage of war production and resistance in the Army, thereby implying Yugoslav military weakness, Satellite radios are trying to offset the psychological gain resulting from the arrival of arms.

It should be noted here that Cominform propaganda has currently made no explicit references to Yugoslav military weakness, such as poor morale, out-dated equipment,\* or the like.

b. Increased Satellite radio discussion of anti-Tito Yugoslav resistance might also be expected to be one component in a program intended to soften up Yugoslav listeners prior to fairly imminent military action. But at least four ancillary considerations tend to counter the applicability of this hypothesis to the material at hand.

1. In the first place, the data reveal that since late May emphasis on civilian resistance has increased considerably more than has emphasis on Army resistance. Were imminent action anticipated, Satellite propagandists might be expected to give much more emphasis to resistance by Army personnel than by civilians, since Army opposition would much more directly imply Tito's military ineffectiveness.

2. As noted above, there have been no explicit and direct allusions to poor military morale, inadequate equipment, geographic vulnerability, etc. Needless to say, Communist output has rarely, if ever, explicitly discussed material military weakness.

3. If increasing concentration on resistance portended hostile action, other military propaganda might be expected to become more threatening and frequent. Few marked quantitative increases or qualitative changes have occurred in material beamed to Yugoslavia. Such charges--qualitative and quantitative--might be expected to increase in the Satellite home services especially. However, it is precisely here that no upward shifts in volume have occurred; if anything, the opposite is true. Nor have qualitative changes occurred.

4. As a plausible pretext for attack, Satellite radios might be expected to concentrate on some such propitious current event as Tito's request for arms (8 April) and Popovic's Washington visit (8 June). The following considerations are relevant to Satellite propaganda use of these two events as pretexts:

(a) While both these "military" events receive considerable attention extending over many weeks,\*\* total attention to the request for arms was higher than to Popovic's negotiations. The reverse might have been expected had there been a desire to play up an event as a pretext. Also there was no concomitant increase in over-all charges dating from the request for arms.

(b) Popovic's visit receives considerably less emphasis in the Satellite home services than does the arms request. Nor do references to the visit exceed references to the request in the Yugoslav beam. And in the last week under survey (17-23 July), total attention to the visit drops markedly.

(c) The treatment given Popovic's visit does not stress charges which portray its consequences as a direct threat to the Satellites themselves. Comment about the results to be expected concentrates on American military domination of Yugoslavia and the arrival of equipment, not how or against whom it will be used.

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\* There had been charges, especially before Popovic's negotiations, that old Hitlerite arms in France were what Tito was receiving.

\*\*Usually, events are played only for two or three weeks and then dropped.

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c. The Cominform may be genuinely worried over the potential strength increases which American arms shipments portend, and hence is engaged in a greater effort to foment and encourage Yugoslav opposition to Tito's military build-up.

The Satellite radios have in no way alluded to defections within the Titoite ranks. But the several recent arrests of highly placed Yugoslav people may have caused the Cominform to revise upward its estimate of the potentialities of resistance propaganda.

d. It may be that the Satellite propagandists, while not yet ready to use more threatening charges against Tito, such as the use to which the new American arms will be put, at the same time desire some step-up in their war of nerves against him. For the present, therefore, an increase in resistance-to-aggression charges may, in Cominform thinking, be sufficient to introduce some friction into the process of Yugoslav rearmament and to maintain or heighten popular Yugoslav anxiety over the possibilities of war. At the same time, current avoidance of threatening charges associated with the arrival of American arms will permit the creation later of a more dramatic case that action by Tito and the U.S. is imminent.

Satellite propaganda since Tito's request for arms and Popovic's visit to Washington has sharply increased its charges that military equipment is arriving in Yugoslavia and that American military men and methods are dominating the Yugoslav Army. As yet, however, such propaganda has evaded speculation as to the use of these new arms. Potentialities for more threatening propaganda exploitation of the receipt of American arms thus remain intact.

## II. Soviet Propaganda Against Tito Since the Korean Negotiations

Soviet radio propaganda denouncing all aspects of the Tito regime (military and non-military alike) has increased to a markedly higher level during the four weeks since the beginning of the Korean negotiations than during any previous comparable period. During the same four weeks, Satellite military charges have also increased, although not as markedly as have all Soviet charges against Tito.

At first glance, their coincidence with the initiation of the Korean negotiations suggests that these increases by Radio Moscow and its Satellites are as much a function of the Soviet global war-of-nerves strategy as of the particular strategy against Yugoslavia itself.

Remembering the disproportionately greater increase in Satellite charges about Yugoslav resistance to Tito's militarism, as compared to other military charges against Tito, it would appear, however, that considerations more intrinsic to the Tito situation might play the predominant part in Satellite propaganda. (See Figure #1.) Were the Satellites intent on maximizing general tension over Yugoslavia, direct emphasis on Tito's aggressive preparations rather than on Yugoslav resistance to rearmament might be expected to stimulate greater fear in Yugoslav listeners, anxiety among West Europeans, and concern among Western officials over Cominform intentions.

## III. Qualitative Indicators Show No Marked Change

Those armed forces charges\* which are considered to be of a more belligerent nature have not increased significantly since the beginning of May. These more belligerent charges include such details as the naming of specific locations, units, and numbers; explicit naming of the target of attack; and, especially, descriptions on an operational level--such as charges of Yugoslav troop maneuvers along the Satellite frontiers. The latter type of charge as broadcast in the Satellite home services have numbered only six in the ten weeks from mid-May through 23 July. This compares with 13 such charges made in the same beams during the previous ten-week period.

\* Included under armed forces charges are statements regarding supplies, equipment, training, strength and operations of the Army.

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As for the number of times a specific Satellite has been cited as the target of attack, there has been no overall increase since late May when Satellite charges of internal Yugoslav resistance began to mount. The number of times which Albania is named in connection with armed forces charges is decreasing. Bulgaria is named somewhat more frequently than previously, but still only half as often as Albania. It should be noted that few of these charges appear in the Satellite home services. (The Free Greece Radio's "Operation Lightning" charges that a combined Yugoslav-Greek invasion of Albania was planned have disappeared. In fact, at present there are virtually no detailed military charges of any kind from the clandestine station, nor is Albania or Bulgaria named as the target of an attack. A minor exception is the discussion of Yugoslav border violations.)

Charges of Western military collaboration with Tito, however, show a definite increase. This increase is linked to the U.S. arms-aid negotiations. In this connection, two types of armed forces charges have been heard more often than previously--i.e., that foreign troops will be brought to Yugoslavia, and that Yugoslav soldiers will be trained by Americans, in both the United States and Yugoslavia.

A number of charges of operations beyond Yugoslavia's borders are made for the first time since last fall. The current charges, made in the context of Popovic's visit, are quite general. For example: "an essential part of these negotiations were connected with the question of allowing the Titoite Army to wage offensive military operations outside the Yugoslav borders." Such charges are not aired in the home services.

Charges which continue to be avoided include literal statements that Yugoslavia is a threat to the Satellites. These are totally absent in broadcasts to Satellite audiences and virtually ignored in broadcasts to Yugoslavia. During the past three months they have appeared only four times. Similarly, the charge that Yugoslavia is trying to frighten the Satellites was made only once in this same period. (Yugoslav broadcasts on the other hand continue to state that they are threatened; but the volume of these claims is much smaller than that recorded last winter.)

Satellite claims of self strength continue to be given relatively slight attention--with the exception of the first week in May when the Czech Liberation Anniversary and May Day boosted the claims to a point higher than at any time at least since last October. Such strength claims are confined to the home services. During the past three months there has been a complete absence of explicit warnings to the Yugoslavs of the consequence of an attack--nothing similar to Malenkov's 1949 warning to the Western world that a new war would mean the graveyard for capitalism. (Here, also, the Belgrade radio presents a contrast with its continuing explicit warnings of the consequences of a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia.)

Satellite denials of military preparations against Tito are fewer than during the previous period. Such denials as made are of a general nature; the more detailed armed forces charges are not denied.

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\* Last fall, it was charged that Yugoslavia was "foreseeing a blitzkrieg a la Hitler and the quick disintegration of Bulgaria and Rumania together with a lightning breakthrough to the Black Sea." This was obviously much more specific and pointed than the current charges.

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
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Figure #1

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MILITARY CHARGES BEAMED TO YUGOSLAVIA

(13 February - 23 July 1951)



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
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Figure #2

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MILITARY CHARGES BEAMED TO SATELLITE HOME AUDIENCES

(13 February - 23 July 1951)



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